The former Pike River mine manager is showing signs of strain during his second day on the stand.
Scroll down for live updates
This morning Doug White was visibly upset as he faced repeated questions about risk assessment at the mine.
Yesterday the inquiry heard Mr White was sending emails while the disaster was unfolding, but he maintained he had no idea a “major incident” had occurred at the time.
The witness was upset yesterday as he recalled how former CEO Peter Whittall had blamed him for a seven percent drop in Pike’s share price.
3 News online reporter Emma Mackie is following the inquiry with live updates throughout the day.
Click here to watch the live stream
The inquiry was stalled yesterday as Mr White’s lawyer repeatedly advised him not to answer questions on the grounds of self recrimination.
LIVE UPDATES
5:04pm – Inquiry adjourned until tomorrow at 9am.
4:36pm - Suppressed evidence.
4:33pm – Was there anyone responsible for co-ordinating all of the elements of information about health and safety issues?
Mr White says the health and safety department would have been responsible.
The witness never had a discussion with Neville Rockhouse about collating all of the health and safety information.
4:30pm – There was no engineering representative on the health and safety committee. Mr White says this concerned him.
4:24pm – The commission is looking at minutes of a health and safety committee meeting outline a series of concerns.
4:22pm – The witness says coal dusting was not initially a major concern at Pike River, because of the wetness of the mine. However, he says as the mine got bigger and things started drying out, it was prudent to put a dusting process in place.
4:19pm – Mr White made reference in his statement to how reporting was “poorly organised and poorly regimented”. He says he wanted to improve that.
4:12pm – In an email from February 15 2010, Mr White referred to “two main needs at Pike”, one was to ensure the mine was compliant, in the email he said, “I find basic non-compliances every time I go underground”.
4:08pm – When Mr White referred to the mine as “needing a cuddle”, he meant it would benefit from some attention.
4:03pm – In the ten months Mr White was at Pike, he acknowledges he arrived in circumstances where the company was under extreme production pressure; he knew of massive challenges ahead in terms of geotechnical knowledge of the mine; he was going into aspects of mining he was not familiar with; and all of these things could impact on pressure on the workforce and safety at the mine.
3:52pm – Mr White is asked about his role in production and business performance at the mine.
The witness says he is a hands-on person. One of the reasons he left a previous role in Australia was because of too much bureaucracy.
3:48pm – Mr White is questioned about his sending of emails around 4:02pm on the day of the explosion.
Counsel asks Mr White why these emails were not referred to in Phase 2 of the inquiry.
Mr White says, at that time during Phase 2, he had forgotten he even had the emails.
The witness understands the families were upset at hearing the evidence about the emails yesterday, but says he was certainly not aware there had been a major incident when he went to send those emails on the day of the explosion.
3:47pm – “There was a blame culture when I arrived at Pike River Coal…rather than looking for a remedy, it was easier to blame people,” says Mr White.
3:41pm – Mr White says his feelings about former CEO Peter Whittall “did not make it easy” to work with him.
3:35pm – Inquiry resumes with cross-examination of the witness by lawyer for the families of the deceased, Nicholas Davidson QC.
Mr White is asked about his reasons for wanting to leave Pike River.
3:17pm – Inquiry adjourned.
2:31pm - Mr White says he was able to tell exactly what gases were present underground. He says it is not true to suggest they did not know what was happening with gases in the mine.
2:27pm – There was a problem with communication devices not working underground.
There were no procedures for starting up generators, but Mr White believes this was rectified prior to the disaster.
There are several more problems listed, but the witness says he cannot remember which ones were rectified before the explosion.
Mr White is advised not to answer questions about whether it was his responsibility to know if the list of issues had been fixed.
2:22pm – A range of incidents are referenced.
2:17pm – Counsel is cross-examining the witness about a record of accidents and incidents.
An incident is recorded on August 9 2010, Mr White says this incident would have been of concern and it was raised with him.
2:12pm – Mr White is asked about safety alert issues he raised as an inspector in Australia.
1:45pm - The commission is discussing suppressed evidence.
1:29pm – The commission is shown a photograph of the roof at spaghetti junction, a busy part of the mine.
High tension cables, carrying 11,000 volts, are seen running close to the gas drainage pipes.
Mr White says it is not “the most desirable set-up” and it could be hazardous.
It is not an arrangement Mr White has come across in any other mine.
1:27pm – In an email from Mr White to his friends, he called Mr Whittall a “dodgy git”.
Mr White says he had probably felt this for some time.
The witness says Mr Whittall seemed to be “not a great fan” of the union.
1:23pm – Inquiry resumes as Mr White is cross-examined by lawyer for the union, Nigel Hampton QC.
Mr Hampton questions the witness about the exit interview he conducted with a Pike deputy.
The deputy was unhappy with shift changes; the state of underground roads; ventilation; and the working attitude of some of the men.
Mr White did not make notes regarding the exit interview, and did not put any systems in place regarding the issues raised.
12:20pm – Inquiry adjourned until 1:20pm.
12:17pm – Discussion turns to the video clip of the portal that was shown to the families and media. There have been questions about the length of the clip and whether it had been edited.
Mr White says he put the clip on a memory stick and gave it to Peter Whittall. He says he is not aware of any editing at all.
12:15pm – The commission is shown an email that indicates “discord” between Mr White and former CEO Peter Whittall. The email to Mr White’s friends says Mr Whittall “tells lies”.
The witness says his disagreement with Mr Whittall was more of a personal nature, he was upset that Mr Whittall had blamed him for a seven percent drop in Pike’s share price.
“It’s not as if we were at eachothers throats, I tried to maintain a professional business relationship,” says Mr White.
12:11pm – Mr White started to question if he was adding any value at the mine around September 2010. He says he thought he might be able to add more value elsewhere.
He says he made a visit to Australia, spoke to his family, and “had a word with himself”. He says, in a way he told himself to “harden up”. He then made the decision to stay at Pike River.
Mr White is again, visibly upset and takes a moment to compose himself.
12:08pm – At no time was Mr White unhappy about what was happening at the mine in terms of what the workforce was trying to achieve.
However, his levels of dissatisfaction were growing in relation to the reporting structure, and performance reviews.
“I have to say that really miffed me…I put a lot of work in with 26 individuals and I was not given the same courtesy,” says Mr White.
12:04pm – Mr White received an email from a recruitment consultant in August, referring to a conversation she had with him about his interest in roles in Queensland.
He says he just liked to “keep his ear to the ground” about what was going on in the industry.
Mr White’s lawyer questions the relevance of this line of questioning. Justice Panckhurst explains the importance of inquiring into Pike River’s “revolving door” in terms of the turnover of mine managers.
12:01pm – Mr White is asked about his plans to leave Pike River, prior to the explosion.
He says, in the first instance, he was approached about a role by a recruitment consultant towards the end of September 2010.
11:58am – Mr White is asked about the second escape route at Pike River. It was identified it would be difficult for the men to climb out of the escape route, Mr white agrees.
The witness is asked how somebody at the top of the AVM panel, needing to wear a self rescuer, would be able to climb out of the vent shaft.
Mr White’s lawyer advises him not to answer the question on the grounds of self recrimination.
11:55am – The former manager of the mine is asked about explosion path planning. He says there was some discussion about it when he came to Pike River.
11:52am – Mr White took on the role of statutory manager of the mine in June 2010. He says he understood this gave him full statutory authority over the mine.
Mr White says he had complete authority over the areas he was asked to have authority over.
Not all areas reported directly to him prior to the official announcement of him as manager in October 2010.
11:49am – Mr White says free-venting of methane from boreholes, is not an uncommon practise in mining. This is contrary to evidence from mine safety expert David Reece, who told the commission he had not seen this done in 20 years.
Free-venting increases the ventilation of methane into the mine, but Mr White says it is a “measured process”.
11:47am – The witness is asked if he felt under pressure to produce coal in the months prior to the explosion.
“The pressure was always on to produce coal Mr Mount…there’s always pressure to produce, it’s how you deal with it…we were taking steps to try and alleviate that pressure,” says Mr White.
11:46am - Mr White says he would find it extremely unusual and hard to believe that Steve Ellis would not have the same regard for safety as he did himself.
11:44am – Mr White says he would not tolerate corners being cut on safety, in order for employees to qualify for production bonuses.
11:41am – Mr White is asked about any pressure he felt with regards to coal production in the months prior to the explosion.
Mr White says as far as he is concerned, commercial pressure does not impact on safety. He says he would not allow himself to be pressured in that way.
11:38am – The commission is shown minutes of a board meeting from November 2010.
An item on the agenda was “health, safety, and environment”. There was a suggestion there needed to be a focus on these issues at this meeting.
Mr White says he “got a fair old drilling” on health and safety at the meeting, and he was not given any specific indication to prepare for the meeting. He says he was asked to just generally speak about the state of health and safety at the mine.
11:34am – Mr White only carried out one exit interview with an employee leaving the mine. He says it was disappointing to find out a lot of information on the day the employee was leaving.
The employee was unhappy about a number of things happening at the mine, including shift changes and the state of the underground roadways.
“He waited til the day he left and just dumped everything on that day…I was very disappointed he didn’t bring that to me earlier,” says Mr White.
He says he didn’t spend time trying to find out why previous mine managers left Pike River.
11:31am – Mr White is asked about the difficulties he faced getting the main fan commissioned.
The importance of the function of the fan, meant he was spending a lot of time at the mine, including weekends, to deal with any issues.
11:27am – The witness says he did not necessarily look at production reports showing problems with ventilation.
The consultant contracted to assist with ventilation issues, says he would have expected to be notified of such problems identified in the production reports.
11:23am - Mr White was not aware of the limited availability of gas detectors in the mine.
11:21am – A report indicates an employee waited five weeks for vital equipment. Mr White says a more systematic approach to highlighting such issues may have been more helpful, but he was satisfied with the system in place.
11:17am – Mr White says it is likely a lot of the measures were brought to his attention. He is confident the matters would have been dealt with satisfactorily.
11:10am – The commission is shown a document recording countless occasions when flammable gas was detected in the general body of air during March and October 2010.
11:03am – Inquiry resumes.
In 2010 it was decided to clear a number of incident reports off the Pike River system.
“A bit of a backlog had developed…the process can sometimes become bogged down…we had to clear the backlog,” says Mr White.
The witness says he does not know what the process for clearing the backlog was.
10:45am – Inquiry adjourned for 15 minutes.
10:43am – Employees were encouraged to record all incidents, no matter how large or small says Mr White.
The incident reports would be referred to Mr White depending on severity.
10:40am – Mr White says incident investigations and reports would come to him at the end of the process, for signing-off.
After Steve Ellis came to Pike River, he took charge of morning meetings and incidents were only brought to Mr White for review, if they were deemed significant.
10:35am – Questions centre around general health and safety at the mine and Mr White’s role, he pauses to compose himself, he is clearly upset.
He says he carried out countless “toolbox talks” reminding employees not to use substandard equipment.
10:34am – Mr White is asked about lead and lag indicators.
He says his involvement was “more hands on, underground up to three times a week”.
10:33am - There was no document at Pike looking at the risk of an explosion or other “high consequence event”.
10:30am – Mr White says he implemented a process to ensure critical tasks were completed before the start of hydro mining.
“As far as practicable, it was a documented process that I was using,” says Mr White.
10:27am – Polaris Consulting was contracted to carry out a GAP analysis. Mr White says most of the people involved in hydro mining at the mine were involved in this analysis.
10:25am – The risk assessment shown to the commission did not address the risk of wind blast or roof fall that could send a methane plug out of the panel.
Mr White says there was a risk assessment done on these aspects, but he does not recall a formal document that shows this.
10:17am – Mr White is answering questions about risks around methane outburst.
10:12am – The action plan from the risk assessment does not have due dates. The action plan was sent out and people were asked to identify the dues dates they thought they could achieve.
10:08am – The commission is shown a list of team members for a risk assessment to establish controls for ventilation and gas management, prior to the start of hydro mining.
The risk assessment is dated September 10 2010, just 12 days prior to the start-up of the hydro monitor. Mr White says this gave sufficient time for any additional precautions to be implemented.
10:02am – As at August 26 2010 there had been no formal risk assessment of wind blast in panel one, although a plan was in place to complete it before hydro mining began at the mine.
10:00am – The witness says he takes responsibility for not enacting the dilution doors.
9:56am – Mr White says he cannot be sure if the formal risk assessment for panel one had been completed as at August 24 2010.
9:50am – The commission is shown an email from August 23 2010 indicating concerns about the lack of formal risk assessments at Pike River, one month out from the start-up of hydro-mining.
The email was copied to Mr White.
9:44am – There were times when levels of methane reached more than 0.25 percent detected in the non-restricted zones.
A report from October 12 2010 shows the methane level exceeded the maximum level acceptable in the non-restricted zone.
Mr White says instances such as this were not notified to him.
“It’s certainly a surprise that there’s that amount,” says Mr White.
The former mine manager was not aware the margin of error on the detectors in the non-restricted zone was 0.25 percent.
9:41am – Mr White is answering further questions about the process of setting restricted zones.
Mr White says he is not certain if there was any formal documentation relating to where the restricted zones were.
9:35am – The commission is shown a map of the restricted and non-restricted zone.
The former manager is explaining how and who defined the zones.
He says he does not know exactly who defined the line between the two zones.
The witness says it was ultimately his responsibility to ensure the line drawn between the zones was correct. He cannot recall exactly when the line was drawn on the map.
9:33am – Mr White is asked about the process to define restricted zones at the mine.
He says he does not know if a risk assessment was done to set the restricted zone.
9:28am – Mr White says he does not know enough about VSDs to know if the specific installation at Pike River was unusual.
VSD: A Variable Speed Drive is a piece of equipment that regulates and controls the speed of an electric motor.
Mr White had no reason to doubt choices made by the electrical team, in terms of the choice of equipment installed at the mine.
9:25am – Overall responsibility for the electrical systems was in the hands of whichever electrical engineer was in charge at the time.
The role of electrical engineer was vacant at the time of the explosion on November 19 2010.
9:22am – The commission is shown a document outlining the role of an electrical supervisor at Pike River.
Mr White says there were a number of electrical supervisors at the mine.
9:20am – Mr White cannot confirm whether a document of procedures in the control room was being followed in relation to gas alarms.
9:16am – An incident management team was never assembled at Pike in response to a gas trigger.
Mr White says there was never a gas trigger that was notified to the inspectorate, as far as he knew.
9:08am – Counsel asks Mr White about procedures in the control room.
The commission is shown a document outlining the responsibilities of the control room officers. One of the roles was to log and follow up gas alarms.
9:04am - The commission is shown an email from former technical services manager Peter van Rooyen, to Mr White, on September 10 2010.
The email relates to the highlander drill rig, Mr White says the number of times it worked well were limited.
9:00am - Inquiry resumes with evidence from former Pike River general manager, Doug White.
3 News